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The subject of this study is the rationale behind two, at first sight con-
flicting trends: on the one hand we see a strong growth in the num-
ber of mergers and acquisitions, and on the other there is much atten-
tion for the (perceived) growing importance of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) for the economy. While many firms grow
larger and larger, government policy is focusing on the small firm,
entrepreneurship and start-ups of new firms, since they are supposed
to stimulate economic growth through a more dynamic economy.
1.1 Motivation and objective
This study primarily serves the objective of an update and increase
of knowledge about scale and determinants of scale (see also previ-
ous EIM studies; among others Carree and Thurik, 1997, and Peters
and Lever, 1996). This study will be useful for other EIM research
where better understanding of scale effects is needed, for instance in
model updates or studies looking at differences between SMEs and
large firms. The study is further aimed at researchers and policy mak-
ers interested in the backgrounds of differences in firm size within
sectors and countries.
This study intends to give an overview of the most important ‘basic
mechanisms’ that are relevant to explain firm size and size distribu-
tion, with the objective of improving our understanding of changes in
scale and scale distribution. Since we want to find explanations for
actual scale and not the optimal (‘technical’) scale, we take into
account cultural and institutional factors and the dynamic situation
of the environment of firms as well. Hence, the objective is:
The following questions are taken as a starting point:
1. How can the development of firm size in the Dutch economy be
described?
2. From which analytical viewpoint(s) should we deal with scale and
scale distribution?
5
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• To give a literature overview of the determinants of firm size
and size distribution (‘basic mechanisms’), and to assess how
structural trends can influence the relative importance of basic
mechanisms for firm or sector size and how they can change
firm or sector size.
B5 determ  5/3/00  11:26 AM  Pagina 53. Which determinants of scale (basic mechanisms) can be found in
economic theory, and how do they interact?
4. Can we illustrate the basic mechanisms using examples of recent
developments in firm size?
5. How do structural trends affect the relative importance of basic
mechanisms in general, and in the actual Dutch situation?
The emphasis in the study is on question 3, the determinants of scale.
Clearly, this question should be followed by the question which
weights can be attached to every determinant of scale, for different
sectors. This (ambitious) question goes beyond the scope of the pre-
sent study, but an empirical elaboration of the determinants of scale
would certainly be an interesting subject for further research.
1.2 Research approach
In this paper we shall try to unravel all different factors that deter-
mine the size of a firm and the differences in size between at first
sight comparable firms. To satisfy the objective of this study, the
research approach follows five steps (see the research questions in
section 1.1), of which step two is elaborated more extensively below.
• Step 1: Describe the statistical development of firm size in the
Netherlands
• Step 2: Analytical viewpoint for looking at determinants of scale
• Step 3: Describe determinants of scale at three levels of analysis
• Step 4: Find practical examples of theoretical issues
• Step 5: Syntheses of scale trends and basic determinants of scale.
Step 2: Analytical viewpoint
‘Basic Mechanisms’
To structure the description of theories about why firms are large or
small and why sectors can have skew size distributions, we deal with
scale from two different viewpoints. The viewpoint of the individual
firm, and that of the sector (or cluster, or sometimes the relevant mar-
ket) in which firms are incorporated.
At both levels, there are relevant attributes of the firm or the sector,
that correspond with different theoretical determinants of scale. For
instance, at the firm level the costs structure of a firm determines
whether economies of scale are relevant for that firm or not. At the
sectoral level, these relationships are less direct, but for instance the
observation of a positive attitude towards co-operation in a sector,
may correspond with the existence of ‘external economies of scale’.
Figure 1.1 shows which ‘basic mechanisms’ or determinants of scale
6
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not be strictly separated in practice; they are separated only for the
clarity of the description.
Figure 1.1 ‘Basic mechanisms’ determining scale at the firm and the sec-
toral level
Level 1: The firm; micro




￿ life cycle of the firm, demand characteristics 
Level 2: Sectors and clusters; meso
￿  external economies of scale and scope
￿  network effects
￿  standard setting and lock-in strategies
To describe the basic mechanisms, we extensively searched the rele-
vant literature. There are some important articles and books on which
parts of this report are based.`The article of You (1995) was very
important in our description of the economies of scale and scope and
transaction-costs theory. Williamson (1998) was also important for
describing transaction-costs theory. Another important article for the
description of agency-costs theory, but also for transaction costs, was
that of Holmstrom and Roberts (1998). To describe the external
economies of scale the article of Ougthon and Whittam (1997) was
relevant and the articles of Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) and Arthur
(1989, 1997) were used to describe the network externalities and
standard setting mechanisms. Furthermore, very important literature
was the book of Pratten (1991), and the industrial organization liter-
ature in Schmalensee and Willig (1989) and Scherer and Ross (1990).
Strategic trends and basic mechanisms
The basic mechanisms from figure 1.1 are helpful in explaining why
firms and sectors have different optimal sizes. However, we are also
looking for explanations for the changes in firm size and size distri-
bution. Therefore, we combine the basic mechanisms with relevant
structural trends that influence these mechanisms (see figure 1.2).
7
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The present study deals with structural trends that are relevant for
firm size. The trends are described only briefly. The emphasis is on
the relation between trends and the determinants of scale at the firm
and the sectoral level. How do trends affect the basic mechanisms
and how does (could) that work out on firm size and size distribu-
tion? It should be noted that these questions will certainly turn out to
be too ambitious to answer them in a scientifically sound manner.
Still, we find them too interesting to leave them totally unanswered.
1.3 Structure of the study
The report starts in Chapter 2 with a brief description of the size dis-
tribution and recent developments in size and size distribution of the
Dutch economy. Chapters 3 and 4 give an extensive literature
overview of the relevant theoretical determinants of scale, at the firm
level in Chapter 3 and at the sectoral level in Chapter 4. The theoret-
ical issues are illustrated with examples from firms or sectors where
interesting developments in scale can be seen. In Chapter 5 we deal
with structural trends that are relevant for firm size and these trends
are described in short. The effects of strategic trends on the basic
mechanisms of Chapters 3 and 4 are elaborated.
8
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1. Firm 2. Sector 3. Structural
trends
Basic Mechanisms
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the Netherlands
To illustrate the relevance of the questions in the introduction, this
section looks at firm-size distribution, developments in average firm
size and the number of mergers and acquisitions in the Netherlands.
The following aspects are elaborated:
1. The skewness of the firm-size distribution in the Netherlands per
sector
2. Development of average firm size and size distribution per sector
3. Development of mergers and acquisitions per sector.
2.1 Dimensions of scale
Before discussing determinants of scale, scale itself should be
defined. Pratten (1991) mentions the following dimensions of scale:
The dimension of scale is often related to number of employees or
sales, but it can also be related to the average size of the industry, so
that a company with (far) more than 100 employees can still be small.
In the Netherlands the following definition is generally used. This
definition is related to the number of employees:
– Small firms:  0-10 employees
– Medium sized firms: 10-100 employees
– Large firms:  ‡100 employees.
In the figures of the next section the above division of size will be
used.
9
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Dimensions affecting efficiency of production Dimensions affecting selling/distribution costs
• Total output of the product • Sales per customer
• Duration of product runs • The number of customers
• The rate of production per unit of time • The geographic concentration of customers
• The extent of standardization
• The capacity of the plant unit & equipment Overall dimensions of scale:
• The total plant capacity • The size of outlets
• The overall size of a complex of plants at one site • The size of firms
• The extent of vertical integration • The size of an industry (average 
• Location (proximity to consumers and transport costs) size & size distribution)
• The scale of a national economy
Dimensions of scale
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In this section we give an impression of the (changes in) size distri-
bution of firms in the Netherlands. It is often expected that the strong
increase in mergers we see over the last decade, should have to
increase average firm size. However, besides many mergers, the num-
ber of new start-ups has also grown very fast. Entrepreneurship is
often seen as the key to economic growth and innovation. This latter
development, together with the many split-ups that follow from
mergers, could cause a decrease in average firm size. Looking at the
statistics, we see that average firm size decreases only slightly over
the last 10 years. The dynamics within sectors, however, are extreme-
ly high.
Size distribution
Figure 2.1 shows the size distribution of firms, measured by the num-
ber of employees (in labour years) in 1998. Ten years earlier, in 1988,
the division in firm size was not very much different. Large firms had
a slightly smaller share (42% instead of 44%) and medium-sized
firms had a slightly larger share (30% instead of 28%). When we
investigate the size distribution of the number of firms, the figure
looks quite different. Most firms are small (90%), while less than 1%
of all firms is large. In the number of firms, the strongest growth over
the last 10 years was in medium-sized firms. While the total number
of firms increased by 30% between 1988 and 1998, the number of
medium-sized firms increased by 44%. The number of small and
large firms increased by 29% and 30%, respectively. Taken together
with the employment figures, we can conclude that while medium-
sized firms increased strongly in number, their employment share
decreased. This can be explained by the fact that the (for the largest
part) positive economic situation in this decade, caused the small
firms to grow strongly and thus become medium-sized, while the
strong medium-sized firms grew to more than 100 employees and
became large.
10
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large firms in the Netherlands, 1998
Source: Bakker, van Noort and Verhoeven, 1999.
From Bakker, van Noort and Verhoeven (1999) it follows that on aver-
age, labour volume per company decreased only slightly in the peri-
od 1988 to 1998, from 8.5 labour years per company to 8.0 labour
years. In most sectors, average firm size decreased, particularly in
manufacturing, construction and in the financial services sector. Only
in the sectors retail trade, hotel & catering, transport and employment
agencies firm size on average increased in the ten years between 1988
en 1998. Table 2.1 shows the average firm size per sector in 1988 and
1998.
The total average firm size is also shown excluding the employment
agencies. In that case average firm size decreases stronger, from 8.2
to 7.4 employees per enterprise between 1988 and 1998. The employ-
ment agencies are left out because when they are included, the
importance of the large firms is overestimated. Employment agencies
themselves are large firms, but they hire personnel to predominantly
small and medium-sized firms. Bakker, van Noort and Verhoeven
(1999) show that the change in firm size was largest in the last years
of this 10-year period. Between 1988 and 1993 average firm size did
hardly decrease.
After the employment agencies, the largest average firm size is found
in manufacturing, transport and communication and the financial
services sector. The sectors with the smallest average size are ‘other
services’ (which exists predominantly of personal services) and hotel
and catering services.
11
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From the information described above, we can conclude that average
firm size in all size classes decreased slightly between 1988 and 1998,
and particularly in the last 5 years of this period. The aggregate divi-
sion over size classes, however, did not structurally change over this
period. Underlying sectoral changes where relatively large, which is
shown below.
Bangma and Verhoeven (2000) describe the dynamics in the number
of firms and employment. They distinguish new firms (starters plus
new subsidiaries), existing firms and exit of firms. From their study
it follows that the number of new firms per year increased from about
33,000 in 1987 to around 60,000 per year in 1998, of which around
42,000 are new start-ups. The number of affiliate firms increased
even stronger than the number of new start-ups. The increase in exits
of firms did not keep up with the growth of new start-ups and affili-
ate firms. There were 34,000 firm exits in 1998.
The new firms are relatively small, about 1.5 persons per firm for
starters and 2.7 persons for new affiliates. Starters did not increase or
decrease in size, while affiliates slightly decreased in size. The firms
12
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Table 2.1 Number of employees (in FTE) per company, per sector and size class, in 1998
1988 1998
small medium large total small medium large total
employees per company
manufacturing 4 35 411 24 3 29 317 19
building 4 30 262 10 3 24 273 8
reparation + trade in cars 3 20 104 5 3 19 285 5
wholesale trade 3 29 270 8 2 23 235 7
retail trade 2 21 822 4 3 22 684 5
hotel and catering 2 26 272 3 3 14 387 4
transport + communic. 3 29 560 12 3 26 546 13
financial services 2 17 869 18 2 15 872 12
business services  2 29 373 6 2 22 371 5
employment agencies 3 36 904 118 4 38 1,512 156
other services 3 39 260 4 2 23 317 3
total 2.6 29 434 8.5 2.5 24 424 8.0
total excluding employment 
agencies 2.6 29 417 8.2 2.5 24 374 7.4
Source: Bakker, van Noort and Verhoeven, 1999.
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1997. This study also shows that on average, firm size decreased
slightly over the last years.
Figure 2.2 shows how the balance of employment change in the peri-
od 1993-1998 was built up. New firms are important for job creation;
they create more than half of all new jobs. Of the incumbent firms,
that existed both in 1993 and at the end of 1997, only one out of three
is growing in employment. Many firms stay the same size, particu-
larly small firms.
Figure 2.2 Changes in employment, 1993 till 1998, divided in gross job cre-
ation and gross job destruction
Source: Bangma and Verhoeven (2000).
Developments in mergers and acquisitions and co-operation
At the same time that average firm size decreased in many sectors,
we see a very strong increase in the number of mergers and acquisi-
tions. While in 1994 the number of concentrations was about 600, in
1998 it had grown to about 1.400. Figure 2.3 shows this increase.
13
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B5 determ  5/3/00  11:26 AM  Pagina 13Figure 2.3 Number of mergers and acquisitions of Dutch companies, total,
in some large sectors, 1994-1998
Source: Delwel/EIM.
Although less strong than the number of mergers and acquisitions,
the number of joint ventures and other types of co-operation between
companies, and relationships such as management buy-ins and co-
maker ships, increased as well.
Table 2.2 splits up the developments for the different sectors. The
table refers to realized mergers, and mergers that are already agreed
upon formally. Manufacturing, business services and wholesale trade
are the sectors in which most mergers are seen. The business services
sector has taken over the second position from wholesale trade
between 1994 and 1998. The share of manufacturing in the total has
decreased (but still in absolute terms there was a strong increase).
1
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manufacturing wholesale trade financial services business services other
1 It should be noted that the numbers in table 2.2 are based on information that was gathered
by Delwel, from publicly available resources. Mergers of small firms that are not published in
newspapers or firms without formal annual reports are not incorporated and thus small firms
are under-represented.
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1998
1994 1996 1998
in % of total
agriculture, etc. 4.3 1.8 2.6
manufacturing 29.8 24.3 25.1
electricity, gas, water production 0.6 0.4 0.8
building 4.9 6.2 5.0
reparation and trade in cars 2.4 1.8 1.6
retail trade 3.8 4.6 4.7
wholesale trade 17.5 14.8 14.7
hotel and catering 1.6 1.1 0.8
transport 4.7 6.7 4.7
postal services and communication 0.8 2.1 2.3
financial services 8.5 10.0 7.1
business services  16.9 18.1 19.9
employment agencies 1.1 1.1 3.0
other 3.1 7.0 7.7
total 100 100 100
Source: Delwel/EIM.
The figures about mergers and joint ventures and the figures about
the developments for different firm types show a dynamic situation,
which is not reflected by the static figures about average firm size (in
table 2.1) and firm-size distribution. While many firms grow larger by
mergers and acquisitions, there are at the same time firms that shrink
in size, firms that quit the market, (merged) firms that split up, and
many new (small) firms entering the market. There are some sectors
that are more dynamic than others. This could reflect changes in the
relevant technology used, changes in demand or other factors. In the
next chapters we shall investigate the theoretical mechanisms that
may cause all these differences in firm size between sectors and
firms, and that cause the changes in size.
15
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firm level
The first level at which determinants of firm size are found, is that of
the individual firm itself. At the firm level, isolated from all environ-
mental factors, there are three important general explanations for
scale from the viewpoint of costs structures of individual firms.
Section 3.1 explains the role of (dis)economies of scale and scope
(including learning and management effects). This is the most tradi-
tional and technical explanation for firm size. The second explanation
for individual firm size is given by the transaction-costs theory; this
theory is elaborated in Section 3.2. In addition to the transaction-costs
theory, Section 3.3 elaborates the theory of agency costs. These three
subjects are also important in explaining firm size at the next level
(the sectoral level, see Chapter 4), but since they interfere at cost
functions of firms, we deal with them in the current Chapter. Section
3.4 concludes. Throughout the text, boxes are presented with an
elaboration of specific themes, or examples of some of the theoretical
issues.
3.1 Economies of scale and scope
Economies of scale occur when an increase in production volume
causes decreasing average costs of production. Economies of scale
can cause increasing returns to scale if increasing all inputs by the
same small proportion brings about an increase in output, which is
greater in proportion. Economies of scope occur when an increase in
the number of products produced decreases the average costs of pro-
duction.
Economies of scale can be internal and external, which means that
they are created within the firm or by co-operation with other firms,
respectively. In this section we focus on internal economies of scale
and scope.
3.1.1 Economies of scale
Internal economies of scale refer to the cost function of an individual
firm and depend on the internal organization and division of
17
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Economies of scale
Economies of scale occur when an increase in production volume
causes decreasing average costs of production.
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cific, and are reflected in the shape of the costs curve and the level of
production. Product-specific economies of scale relate to the produc-
tion volume of a single product, while plant-specific economies of
scale are related to the total output of a plant (possibly several prod-
ucts), and multi-plant (or -firm) economies of scale relate to opera-
tion of the multiple plants in one firm. The latter two types are found
predominantly in secondary business functions such as R&D, HRM,
purchasing, marketing and sales activities) (see Scherer & Ross, 1990,
p. 97).
Economies of scale are found when the (long-run) average total costs
curve (fixed plus variable costs) is sloping downwards. Below, we
focus on the factors that cause the average cost curve to slope down-
wards (part I in figure 3.1 below) (see a.o. Pratten, 1991):
Figure 3.1 Decreasing and increasing long-run average costs curve
Factors causing the average costs curve to slope downwards
Indivisibilities
Indivisibilities are fixed costs that do not vary with the level of pro-
duction, so that average total (fixed plus variable) costs are higher
with low production volumes. In the short run there are many indi-
visibilities, like machines, buildings, costs of research and develop-
ment or design, costs of information gathering, advertising, etc. A
type of indivisible inputs are ‘threshold costs’. These are for instance
the costs of a manager or entrepreneur, the driver in a bus or service
personnel at a checkout point in a shop. For example, to run a shop,
at least one person should be available, even when there are almost
18
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‘economies of increased dimensions’ as a type of indivisibility, this is
comparable to threshold costs. They apply when the costs of invest-
ing in a larger machine, building or other kind of capital equipment
increases capacity more than proportionally. For instance when a
new (similar) factory is built, output should at least double, to make
the investment worthwhile. Indivisibilities are most important in cap-
ital-intensive industries, but in service industries or knowledge-inten-
sive industries they do play a role as well. Threshold costs are the
most important indivisibilities in those industries.
Economies of specialization and organization
The larger the output of a product, plant or firm, the larger the oppor-
tunities for and advantages of specialization will be, both in labour
and capital inputs. The traditional example is the automobile assem-
bly line that was first introduced by Ford. While these traditional
assembly lines are less popular today because of the disadvantages
for (labour satisfaction of) workers, specialization is a very important
factor of efficiency increase in many work processes, for instance by
using robots to further reduce the human factor, but specialization is
also seen in special departments for R&D, personnel management,
administration, etc. Maljers (1999) mentions the example of Nike.
This firm is to a very large extent vertically disintegrated. Nike itself
performs only design, marketing and quality control. All other busi-
ness functions (production, distribution, etc.) are sourced out.
Economies due to risk spreading
Big firms face lower risks due to risk spreading. Note that this does
not entail risk spreading over different products (source of economies
of scope), but instead over several countries, regions or individual
customers. For instance, large oil companies spread production over
different countries, which is important because of political risk fac-
tors (see Maljers, 1999). Smaller firms have fewer clients or less diver-
sification in their clients, so they face higher risks. The source of the
higher risks for small firms is often found in sunk costs.
These sunk costs don’t have to be examples of indivisibilities, since
they can be scale dependent but once these costs are made the
money cannot be retrieved. The fact that small companies face high-
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Sunk costs:
• Sunk costs are different from other costs in that they result in
assets for which there is no market, so once they are bought,
regaining the investment on the market is impossible.
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ply of capital will be better for large firms than for smaller firms.
Economies of massed resources
When a company uses more capital and labour, it can economize on
spare parts, stockholding and the division of labour. Small firms
should keep relatively higher stocks and more spare parts than large
firms do, to avoid risks of discontinuity of the production process,
selling out or quality loss.
Learning or experience effects
Where scale and scope are cross-sectional effects, that of experience
is a time-serial effect (Thurik, 1996). An increase in production of a
new product or the use of new technology leads to declining unit
costs since the people working with the product or technology grow
more experienced and the organization or firm also learns from ear-
lier faults or inefficiencies. The longer a firm is in business, or the
higher the firms’ cumulative production is, the greater will normally
be the experience and know-how, particularly experience and know-
how that cannot be achieved by education (tacit knowledge
1). So not
only individual people learn but also organizations.
Nooteboom (1993) distinguishes between learning effects and expe-
rience effects. The process of learning is divided in stages of percep-
tion, interpretation and evaluation. It depends strongly on the (firm
or social) environment how and what people learn. Firms should
acknowledge that people might fail to perceive, understand or appre-
ciate developments that present threats or opportunities to the firm.
Experience effects are not so strongly related to human learning and
more to organizational learning. Experience effects follow from accu-
mulated production since the start of the activity. An important exam-
ple of economies of experience is the reputation of experience that a
firm builds up after many years, that generates a lower perceived
financial risk and facilitates access to credit.
2 A brand name can be
used to communicate the comparative advantage of a product as the
result of a ‘rich history’ of learning, and to strengthen the reputation
of experience. The subscript ‘since 1857’ on a bottle of Heinz ketchup
is used to tell the customer that this producer has made ketchup for
almost 150 years and during that time made it an art.
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1 Tacit knowledge is implicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge cannot be codified or otherwise trans-
mitted to other people.
2 This example of access to credit can be a partial explanation for the fact that large firms are
often more capital-intensive and small firms more labour-intensive (You, 1995, p. 453).
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Vertical integration
1 can decrease different kinds of costs. For
instance, transport costs and costs of stock holding can decrease
when parts of the production process are moved from several sites to
one site. When trying to explain the boundaries of the firm from the
theory of economies of scale, the activities of a firm should be split
in the relevant business functions or processes. As said before, every
process or function can have a different optimal scale and there is
always a trade-off between outsourcing and vertical integration of
some business functions. For instance for a car factory, the optimal
scale of stamping the body parts may be a lot larger than the optimal
scale of assembling the cars from their different parts (see Scherer
and Ross, 1990). To explain the outsourcing or integration decisions,
not only scale economies (see also economies of specialization and
organization above), but also transaction-costs economies are rele-
vant. Transaction costs can be reduced after vertical integration. An
integrated firm no longer has problems of control, uncertainty or
quality with suppliers, and thus reduces the transaction costs.
Integration of activities within one firm can also be necessary when
there are no competitive supplier markets. For instance, a large fac-
tory that is strongly dependent on the quality and continuity of ener-
gy delivery may have a strong incentive to (partially) take care of its
own energy provision. This is particularly the case when one firm
dominates the energy market and that firm can give no guarantees for
good service in case of problems (see also box 3.2). Transaction costs
are further elaborated in section 3.2.
3.1.2 Diseconomies of scale
All the factors discussed above can cause the (long-run) average costs
(curve) to decrease, but this may not go on indefinitely; in nearly all
production and distribution operations, the realization of scale
economies appears to be subject to diminishing returns (see Scherer
& Ross, 1990, p. 102).
For most causes of economies of scale mentioned, there are different
‘countervailing powers’ that offset the economies of scale and may
even turn into diseconomies of scale. The following are the most
important.
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1 Vertical integration is integration of firms at different levels of the production process, such
as a producer who integrates with a distributor or a supplier.
Diseconomies of scale
Diseconomies of scale are found when an increase in production
volume causes increasing average costs of production.
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If production increases indefinitely, fixed costs and threshold costs
become insignificant and after some point the average costs will no
longer fall when production rises further. With threshold costs, pro-
duction volume can rise so that new investments are needed (a new
machine, an extra service desk in a shop). Fixed costs per product (or
service) will tend to zero when production is large enough. The same
holds for economies of increased dimensions and the advantages of
massed resources. Also, the effects of specialization of capital and
labour stop when everything is specialized to the maximum and no
further business functions can be outsourced or otherwise performed
more efficiently. Learning curves will also flatten out with production
increases.
Factors that cause average costs to increase when production rises
(diseconomies of scale, see part II of figure 3.1) are looked at below.
These factors have in common that they follow from intransparency
of the organization (or the market) and of information asymmetry
between actors.
Factors causing average cost curve to increase
Bottleneck production factors
Next to these factors that may cause unit costs to level out after
expanding production beyond a certain scale, other limiting factors
for further expansion can be a lack of skilled workers, raw materials,
capital or other input factors (such as technical forces), so that with
increasing production less efficient factors of production have to be
used or factors even become unavailable.
Labour relations
Labour satisfaction in large companies is often found to be less than
in small companies. Specialization of labour in large firms may make
jobs less challenging and demanding, which may reduce the motiva-
tion and dedication of workers. Large companies also often have
longer hierarchy chains, which reduces the communication between
management and work floor, makes responsibilities less clear and
makes the organization more bureaucratic than smaller organiza-
tions. Modern management techniques are often used to reduce these
problems but at some point, the labour relations can still be sources
of increasing unit costs (see You, 1995).
Managerial diseconomies
Closely related to the diseconomies of labour relations are manageri-
al diseconomies. The span of control of managers is limited and the
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firm size. Of course, management can be decentralized and special-
ized, and thus generate economies of scale. When a firm grows too
large, however, it is often found that bureaucracy, limited control,
inflexibility of the organization and co-ordination problems will pre-
vail and turn into diseconomies of scale that increase unit costs (how-
ever, the point were a firm gets too large seems to have shifted in
time, as a consequence of the application of modern management
theories and the use of, for instance, communication technology).
Inflexibility of the large firm has two major reasons:
• Lack of proximity: new opportunities and threats take more time
to be spotted
• Organizational inflexibility: the organization of a big firm is by
nature more complex and more difficult to change; it is an enor-
mous web of interrelations.
Next to the span of control, another factor of managerial dis-
economies of scale is found in the motives of managers that may
diverge further from those of the owners (stockholders) when firms
grow larger. While the best option for the stockholders may be to stop
investing in a (mature) firm and to use the money to invest in more
profitable products or firms, the manager in general tries to hold on
to his status and (over-)invest in the firm (see section 3.4 about the
life cycle theory and box 3.1).
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Box 3.1 Small or big?
Nowadays, if companies decide to grow bigger or smaller it hap-
pens most of the time by mergers and take-overs or by splitting up
business, respectively. While on the one side companies are more
and more willing to join forces, on the other side there is a move
towards splitting up businesses. Endogenous growth is considered
uncertain and time-consuming. Here we investigate these devel-
opments more closely to find out what kind of companies split up
and which ones join forces.
Recent examples show that most of the time mergers and acquisi-
tions are seen between direct competitors in the same activities.
NRC (Oct. 1, 1999): ‘Back to basics is the motto of the main part
of German companies. To be able to grow anyway most of these
companies seek refuge in mergers and acquisitions.’ The
Economist (Jan. 9, 1999) states: ‘Less than 10% of mergers now go
beyond a core business.’ These developments find their roots in the
wish for scale economies and for an acquisition of specialist skills
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and knowledge in niche or sub-markets (such as private banking,
sports cars, etc.). The splitting up of businesses often takes place
when a company is a collection of heterogeneous business units,
sometimes after a merger. So the empirical reality of business
trends seems to favour scale over scope. 
Tamminga, in NRC (May 22, 1999), mentions three possible rea-
sons behind the growing number of split-ups:
1. The bounded capabilities of managers: While few conglomer-
ates flourish, most of the time there is a significant loss of cap-
ital and human talent involved when activities are strongly het-
erogeneous. Not everyone is a top-manager and particularly the
board of directors more and more recognizes this.
2. Opportunism: The increasing drive for concentration in some
markets puts pressure on the management of conglomerates to
look for or accept the higher and higher bids for single business
units.
3. Stock value: The stock value of a chain of business units does
not represent the average profitability but that of the weakest
link. So while working as a conglomerate may be positive for
risk spreading, conglomerates are at a disadvantage when it
comes to obtaining capital against optimal stock values.
These three points reflect the now popular ‘back to basics’ view.
This view seems to be dominant nowadays among stockholders.
De Waard, in NRC (Oct. 10, 1999) says that who gets back to basics
is rewarded; already the announcement of such actions results in
higher stock rates.
Box 3.2 Innovation diseconomies 
According to The Economist (Dec. 4, 1999), innovation is the new
key word in American management. Further re-engineering and
outsourcing will no longer be effective. Innovation is often adopt-
ed by mergers; the big companies spent fortunes on licensing and
buying others’ intellectual property. But that creates a new prob-
lem, since innovation strategies are often expected to work best
inside smaller companies. It seems that there are certain innova-
tion diseconomies of scale.
B5 determ  5/3/00  11:26 AM  Pagina 24Transport and distribution costs
With larger production volumes at one site (this does particularly
count at the level of outlets, not companies) transportation costs of
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The Economist mentions two reasons why bigger firms lose terrain
in innovation:
• Cheap venture capital: Scientists with good ideas are no longer
dependent on the multinationals to realize their inventions,
they are often able to start their own companies, or sell the
products of their research to the large companies, at the stage
where economies of scale are becoming important. This is not
so much a diseconomy of scale as it is a reduction of an impor-
tant economy of scale of the past.
• Many things established firms do well, such as looking after
their current customers, results from properties that hinder
innovative behaviour. This is particularly the case when the
innovation deals with ‘disruptive’ or radical technologies.
Often, the new technology competes with the traditional busi-
ness of an enterprise (Internet banking, e-commerce).
These were some of the rational reasons, but sometimes the panic
in big firms seems more the result of overvaluation of small
Internet firms than of a real crisis of innovation in bigger firms.
Because of this overpricing smaller firms are able to remain inde-
pendent even without making profits, these companies are boom-
ing and attract talented staff from bigger firms. And when bigger
ones buy the smaller firms, the talented staff that produced valu-
able ideas proof hard to keep. One solution in this overall panic is
searched in increasing ‘intrapreneurship’ and thus trying to make
innovation more of a bottom-up process.
Some experts think that this restructuring towards intrapreneur-
ship, combined with the strategy of buying small and innovative
firms, will not improve the results of large companies. In their
view, big companies should focus on their own specific strengths
and thus concentrate on projects with high costs and low uncer-
tainty, leaving low cost-high uncertainty projects to mature in
small companies before adopting them. In other words, bigger
companies should just deal with the innovation economies and
diseconomies of scale and make them work for the company,
instead of wasting energy fighting against them.
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increase. It depends on the size of the market relative to the size of
the producer how important these costs are. If a firm’s optimal size
(or minimum efficient scale) is so large that it should meet all
demand in a large region, transport and distribution costs are more
important than in case of several firms producing at optimal size in
the same regional market. High transport costs in terms of consumer
time or producer costs stimulate proximity of production to con-
sumers and thus the existence of small firms. Particularly for services
and high-volume or highly perishable goods, transport costs can be
high. Caused by technological development, transport costs and
transport time structurally decreased over the last century. However,
even in the age of Internet and e-commerce, transport costs still are
important in explaining the existence of for instance small shops,
cafés and restaurants. For this kind of firms, location close to cus-
tomers is an important competitive advantage. Besides, if firms pro-
duce for regions that are different in terms of consumer tastes, distri-
bution costs are also relatively high in terms of marketing (see
Thurik, 1996).
3.1.3 Economies of scope
Economies of scope are comparable to economies of scale. Average
costs do not decrease with increasing volume of production but with
an increasing number of different products made.
Economies of scope occur when there are indivisibilities (as with
scale economies) in inputs to the production process, or when there
are complementarities. These complementarities can be found in the
following aspects (see Nooteboom, 1993).
Complementarities
• Residual materials of production: For instance, the use of remain-
der energy that follows from industrial production for producing
own energy.
• Risks: For instance, diminishing risks of currency fluctuations by
both importing and exporting.
26
Determinants of scale at the firm level
Economies of scope
Economies of scope occur when an increase in the number of differ-
ent products produced, causes average costs of production to fall.
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demand peaks are produced/sold by one company, such as ice
cream and hot chocolate.
• Brand name: New products can benefit from established brand
names.
• Technology: When the same technology can be used for produc-
tion of different products. This advantage is most obvious for prod-
ucts that are technically identical but are placed on the market as
different products, with new design, marketing, etc. In fact, goods
that are from a technical viewpoint homogeneous goods, can be
heterogeneous from an economic/marketing point of view.
Synergy
Another important factor for economies of scope is interaction
between different product groups of a company, for example discus-
sions during business meetings, where experiences and new insights
are shared. This is particularly relevant if the products are counter-
parts for a single final product, and specifications vary constantly.
This interaction requires coincidence of time and often also of space
(although electronic communication changes these requirements).
Inseparability is also a reason for economies of scope. Think, for
instance, of a soccer team without a goalkeeper, or an orchestra with-
out a conductor. All these factors are examples of synergy, an often
heard buzzword in management literature, entailing that the entirety
is more than the sum of the individual parts, or: energy comes from
the right combination of people and equipment in a stimulating envi-
ronment.
3.1.4 Diseconomies of scope
Diseconomies of scope can be seen as the factor behind the ‘back to
basics’ trend that was important over the last decade (see also box
3.1). The factors causing diseconomies of scope are comparable to
those causing diseconomies of scale (see section 3.1.2), and most are
found in the field of human capabilities. Often, the ‘back to basics’
trend is caused by changes in weight attached to economies of spe-
cialization and economies of scope. If a firm makes one field of prod-
ucts (say, four-wheel drive all-terrain vehicles like Landrover pro-
duces), the knowledge gained while working with that product is also
relevant to problems with related products, such as sedans or motor-
cycles (economies of scope). On the other hand, specializing in one
product decreases the complexity of the organization, and has other
economies of scale (or of specialization). For instance, customers are
more homogeneous when one sells four-wheel drives only, and this
27
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ing (sponsor four-wheel events and teams).
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Box 3.3 Rethinking the traditional organization: splitting up
key  activities
Hagel and Singer (1999) recently wrote an article in the Harvard
Business Review in which the key question was: ‘What business
are you really in?’ They stated that the answer for most companies
would be: in three, and that they don’t even know it. The question
and its answer were based on the fact that most companies have
three main activities of which the writers think that they belong to
separate businesses.
First, these three activities and their characteristics are discussed:
product innovation, customer-relationship management and infra-
structure management.
Source: Hagel and Singer, 1999.
According to the authors, these three activities rarely map the
organizational structure of a corporation correctly. Product inno-
vation, for example, typically extends beyond the boundaries of a
product development unit (its logical organizational ‘home’ unit)
to include such activities as conducting market research, training
of employees, etc. Rather than representing discrete organization-
al units, the three activities correspond to what are popularly
called ‘core processes’. Because these activities, as shown, have
imperatives that are by nature conflicting, Hagel and Singer (1999)
see them as separate businesses. So the key question (‘What busi-
ness are you really in?’) has three answers for most multination-
als: one company, three businesses is commonplace. This will in
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To compose the long-run average cost curve (LRAC) of a firm (or an
industry), all fixed and variable costs are added. The cost curve thus
combines the costs of production, where economies of scale are
important, and costs of management and organization, where the
most important diseconomies of scale prevail (when production
grows large enough). To complicate things, most firms produce more
than one product, with a different optimal scale for every product,
and often the most efficient scales of the different production process-
es needed do not fit perfectly well either. This leads in most cases to
a U-shaped cost curve, from which an optimal firm size (production
volume with the lowest average costs) can be determined.
1 The low-
29
Determinants of scale at the firm level
the end hinder optimalization and will lead to a fracturing of glob-
al companies along the fault lines between these activities. The
authors use the newspaper industry as an example of how things
have changed and will change according to their theory:
• Product innovation: This activity is increasingly being out-
sourced; the average metropolitan newspaper relies on wire ser-
vices, syndicated columnists and publishers of speciality maga-
zine inserts to fill the paper each day. 
• Infrastructure management: Many newspapers rely on special-
ist printers that produce the paper for them. So, just as product
innovation, this activity has become a separate industry.
• Customer-relationship management: This is more and more
becoming the focus of the papers, attracting and binding cus-
tomers to a concept.
So the old-fashioned newspaper with in-house journalism and
printing is soon making way to new-style organizations that give
new meaning to the term back to basics. Hagel and Singer (1999)
think that this is a rational development and will lead the way for
other industries to follow.
1 The LRAC curve can also be structurally downward sloping (or L shaped), which implies the pro-
duction process is a natural monopoly. In this case fixed costs are high enough to offset all
other costs and production is most efficient if there is only one firm, so that one firm can meet
all market demand at a lower cost than two or more firms could. Examples of natural mono-
polies are found in network industries such as railway and metro networks or fixed telephony
networks. In the latter example, however, the natural monopoly is no longer a fact, since tech-
nological developments made it possible to use other (existing) fixed networks, like the ener-
gy and television cables, for telephony as well.
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(MES), i.e. the smallest scale at which minimum unit costs are
attained (Scherer & Ross, 1990, p. 103). In figure 3.1 an LRAC curve
is presented.
Practical limitations to optimal scale determination
Although the theory of economies of scale and scope provides an
elaborate explanation of how the optimal size of firms can be deter-
mined, in real life we see that within industries similar firms have
very different sizes. There are, within the theory of economies of
scale and scope, different explanations for this fact, some of which
are already mentioned.
Homogeneous goods is no realistic assumption
First, a limitation to the application of the theory of economies of
scale and scope lies in the fact that the theory presupposes homoge-
neous goods. However, even in the (very rare) cases of goods that are
technically seen perfectly homogeneous, there can be differentiation
when the producer adds value in, for instance:
• reputation
• service
• convenience of a distribution concept, etc.
Most companies try to differentiate their products from their com-
petitors by creating comparative advantages in one of these fields.
What really matters is not whether engineers see the difference
between two competing products but that consumers see the differ-
ence, or just feel it.
Costs curves may have a range of points where scale is ‘optimal’
Second, there can be constant returns to scale after the point where
the minimum efficient scale is reached. In that case, the lowest point
of the cost curve is flat for a large part, see figure 3.2. The costs curve
can also be at the lowest point at different output levels with inter-
vals of high unit costs in between. In these cases, the optimal scale
is not a single point but can be a (large) range of output levels.
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volumes
Technology and other input factors are not homogeneous either
A third explanation is that technology can be heterogeneous, and dif-
ferent firms use different technologies for the production of the same
products (and thus these firms have different cost functions, and dif-
ferent optimal scales). Fourth, differences in firm size can be caused
by heterogeneous quality of fixed input factors such as management
and entrepreneurship.
3.2 Transaction-costs theory
Transaction-costs economics is important in explaining why firms
exist and why firms grow larger. This theory does not explain why
production processes grow larger (as the theory behind economies of
scale and scope does) but why firms integrate up- or downstream
activities within one firm (vertical integration), while other firms spe-
cialize to make full use of economies of scale. Transaction-costs eco-
nomics supplement the neo-classical economic theory with explana-
tions for the ‘make-or-buy’ decisions of firms. You (1995) states it as
follows: ‘While in the technological approach (economies of scale
and scope), firm size is determined by efficient allocation of
resources, the transaction costsapproach incorporates the costs of the
process of allocation itself. This process consists of contracting, bar-
gaining, control, etc.’.
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Holmstrom and Roberts (1998). When the market mechanism would
be the optimal mechanism of allocating scarce resources, there would
not be so much activity within firms. Coase explained the existence
of integrated firms by transaction costs in a world with imperfect
information. As opposed to the behavioural assumptions of neo-clas-
sical economists, economic agents are considered to be bounded in
their rationality, which makes room for opportunism. Bounded ratio-
nality origins from scarcity of information and limited capacity for
information processing. To prevent opportunism from occurring, con-
tracts should take opportunism into account. Bounded rationality and
opportunism are the reason why transaction costs exist and why
organizing and co-ordinating production are less costly in a formal
organization than co-ordinating every aspect through a market.
Stages of transactions




In the first stage, of contact, there are search costs made by the buyer
and marketing costs made by the seller. In the stage of contract, the
costs are made in the preparation of an agreement to transact, in
which it is attempted to anticipate possible problems during execu-
tion. These costs include searching information on the reliability of
the transaction partner or the degree to which investments will be
sunk, or costs of negotiation, legal advice, etc. In the stage of control,
after the commitment to transact has been made, there are costs of
monitoring and probably also of arbitration, litigation, loss of invest-
ments due to the relation breaking up, etc. (Nooteboom, 1993).
Frequency, uncertainty, asset specificity
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Transaction costs
Transaction-costs theory explains the ‘boundaries of the firm’ not
only with technical cost factors, but also with the costs of the allo-
cation process. Costs of allocating are, for instance, costs of bar-
gaining, drawing up contracts and costs of control of different
processes and contracts.
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er are the costs of outsourcing. Costs of outsourcing are also high
when there is much uncertainty about a relationship or a contract
(for instance, it can be uncertain whether the supplier will always
deliver in time, or whether the products are always of good quality).
High asset specificity means that the investment in a relationship has
sunk costs
1; the alternative uses or proceeds of the investment are
low (for instance, when a firm develops special equipment that can
be used to make a product for one of their customers only).
2
The higher the levels of uncertainty and asset specificity, the more
complex contracts between firms are. Organization within a firm can
lower costs in these cases, compared to market organization. The
three factors frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity are positive-
ly related to internal governance (within the firm). If these factors are
high, vertical integration is more likely.
3.2.1 Transaction costs and firm size
In general, transaction-costs theory shows that for transactions with
low transaction costs, outsourcing can be attractive (for instance, for
business functions in which there are economies of scale for the spe-
cialized firm and diseconomies of scope for the outsourcing firm),
while for transactions with high transaction costs (high frequency,
high asset specificity, high risk) integration in the hierarchy of the
firm is preferable.
Below, the main assumptions and determinants of transaction costs
are discussed and ‘checked’ for scale effects (Nooteboom, 1993).
Assumptions of behaviour:  bounded rationality and opportunism
Characteristics of contracts: frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity.
Bounded rationality
Bounded rationality is a relatively larger cost factor in small firms
than in large firms, because small firms have disadvantages along
three ‘dimensions of rationality’.
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1 The distinction between sunk costs and other costs is that the former results in assets for
which there is no market, so once bought regaining of the money is impossible.
2 Asset specificity can create the ‘hold-up problem’, which gives a traditional explanation for
increases in firm size (particularly vertical integration), according to Holmstrom and Roberts
(1998). The hold-up problem is a type of market failure which occurs when contracts involve
fixed costs in relationship-specific assets and this changes bargaining positions between the
contracting parties over time and creates market power for one of the parties (once the sunk
investment is made by the supplier, then the buyer has a stronger position and can start to
re-negotiate the conditions of the contract (see CPB, 1997, p. 50).
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support. Larger firms need more information, but are also better
able to employ specialized staff in different functional areas.
• Depth: In small firms the education level of the entrepreneur and
staff is generally lower than in large firms, which limits the capac-
ity to absorb external information. Of course, there are many
exceptions to this fact, for instance small firms in science-based
sectors.
• Variety: In small firms, the perspective from which external scan-
ning is performed is often dominated, and thereby restricted, by
the personal perspective of the entrepreneur.
To compensate for these disadvantages compared to large firms,
small firms make more costs, for instance by extensive external net-
working, which again increases transaction costs for the small firm
(these costs are called second-order costs of transaction).
Opportunism and uncertainty
Smaller firms face higher transaction costs because they are more
sensitive to uncertainty and they are more vulnerable to opportunism
of (large) transaction partners. On the other hand, small firms (and
particularly new firms) bring about higher transaction costs for their
partners because of a higher perceived risk, due to lack of reputation
and the risk of discontinuity; for instance, a firm that has built up a
reliable name as a transaction partner, offers a reduction of the per-
ceived risk of opportunism and thereby offers lower transaction costs
to current and potential partners at the expense of the foregone ben-
efits of opportunism.
Asset specificity
A disadvantage for small firms is that, due to their size, which makes
it impossible to gain economies of scale, small firms often follow
niche strategies and specialize in certain products or services. This
increases the risk of investing in and dependency on customer-spe-
cific relations (asset specificity). Besides, smaller firms often lack the
formal administrative and monitoring procedures that are required in
the ‘control’ stage of contracts.
It can be concluded that in vertical relations between a larger and a
smaller firm, the smaller firm generally faces the biggest part of the
transaction costs, which can result in one-sided dependency if the
small firm cannot develop countervailing power. Nooteboom (1993)
signals that small firms try to compensate for transactional weakness
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small firm such as market flexibility, motivation, entrepreneurial
drive, unorthodox ventures, niche markets or by being ‘lean and
mean’.
3.3 Agency-costs theory; motivation of
individuals
Coase’s theory of the firm, where transaction costs explain the
boundaries of the firm (or the choice between market and firm co-
ordination of transactions), has got several extensions. One of the
best known is that of agency costs.
In Ekelund and Hébert (1997) and Schmalensee and Willig (1989, Ch.
2), agency-costs theory is explained as a factor that can justify verti-
cal integration or disintegration. The theory is about how important
the right incentives are, when people or firms co-operate in activities
with a joint output. Most of the activities of firms involve team effort,
and a team, like a chain, is only as strong as its weakest link. When
inputs of different team members are not measurable or very difficult
to measure, a free-rider problem can arise. Individuals can choose to
work without any dedication or to hardly work at all (shirking).
Monitoring the team members can in theory prevent this unproduc-
tive behaviour. When the firm owner does the monitoring, this solu-
tion will work, since the owner has the incentive of maximizing his
revenues. When, however, the monitoring is done by a manager, and
the manager does not have the right incentives to optimize produc-
tivity, the manager himself should be monitored as well.
Managers’ motives and firm size
There are also less rational and less economic factors playing a role
in why firms grow or stay small, like the motivation of the entrepre-
neur, the manager or the stockholders of a firm. Not all small firms
want to grow large and not all mergers are motivated by cost factors.
This latter factor is worked out more extensively in box 3.4.
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Agency costs
Agency-costs theory is about the different motives of ‘principals’
and ‘agents’. It looks at how incentives should be directed in situa-
tions where people or firms co-operate in activities with a joint out-
put. Principals are owners or shareholders, agents are employees or
managers.
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Box 3.4 Irrational motives behind mergers?
Fast growth of main activities is not the only reason why compa-
nies join forces, it is in fact well-known that mergers often don’t
bring increased profitability (stock value) at all: The Economist
(Jan. 9, 1999) shows that repeated analyses have all reached the
same conclusion: in the medium term, fewer than half of all merg-
ers add value. Another source (Beursmedia/Betten, Oct. 13, 1999)
shows that 70% of the mergers in which at least one big company
is involved turn out to be a waste, 15% even result in a failure and
only 15% are a success (in the Netherlands). Recent statistics
show that while the rate of the average stock does climb when the
announcement of a merger is made, after 6 months this develop-
ment doesn’t persist, after 18 months the extra value is totally gone
and after three years the stocks are traded at prices below the gen-
eral average. They also show that 50% of the mergers among the
big conglomerates are turned back after a while.
Then what are the other reasons, besides rational economic analy-
sis? Roughly, the arguments can be divided into two main cate-
gories:
1. Status: The urge of a company to be the market leader, and the
drive of career-driven managers to make a mark. As it is stated
in The Economist (Jan. 9, 1999) ‘For a manager the surest way
to make a mark in a short time (job times of ‘chief executive offi-
cers’ (CEOs) are five years on average) is to buy something big.’
2. Defensive reactions: In a world where scale economies have
become magic words, a CEO’s worst nightmare is to be too late
and, when the merger game is over, to be the only small player
left. Other reasons for defensive reactions are based on the wish
for autonomy (if in the end you are the only small fish in the
pool, you will be eaten yourself) or on the fear of looking fool-
ish. According to The Economist (Jan. 9, 1999) managers are
frightened by contracting markets (for instance, in the defence
industry), by falling commodity prices (for instance, in the oil
industry), by excess capacity in key markets (for instance, in the
car industry), by the uncertainties of technological change (for
instance, with banking and telecom), or by the soaring costs of
research (for instance, in pharmaceuticals).’
While the first motive, status, is a psychological reason, the second
motive, defensive reactions, can be economic in its nature. The fact
that fear is a strong motivation behind many conditions shows,
however, that these decisions are often not rational.
B5 determ  5/3/00  11:26 AM  Pagina 363.3.1 Agency costs and firm size
The view of the manager as monitor of team members and team pro-
duction raises some important questions: who will, for instance,
monitor the manager? Does the manager also have an incentive to
shirk? Ekelund and Hébert (1997) show that the institutional compo-
sition of the firm is relevant to answer these questions, and particu-
larly the pattern of incentives, both positive and negative, given to
managers. Firstly, managers are disciplined by the market. If they per-
form poorly, monitor-managers will be fired and the owner will
install competing managers. Secondly, managers can be rewarded as
‘residual claimants’ who share in the profits or rewards of team pro-
duction. Managers thus have both positive and negative incentives to
be efficient monitors of team production.
The following assumptions are relevant for firm size:
1. The ownership of the firm (I): For a small firm the manager is con-
sidered to be the owner or at least to be an important stockholder,
or to be closely related to one of these. Managers of larger firms,
however, are considered to be more comparable to normal employ-
ees, who may face profit sharing but are not so-called residual
claimants.
2. The ownership of the firm (II): The owner of a small firm is more
interested in the whole picture (in the continuity of the firm, job
security for the entrepreneur himself and the employees, etc.)
compared to the shareholder of a multinational who is only inter-
ested in profit (expectations) and the value of his shares.
3. The organization of the firm: The small firm has fewer layers so
that the owner at the top of the hierarchy has (almost) daily con-
tacts with the ‘work floor’. For this reason, for the owner of a small
firm, monitoring takes less time and effort than for the owners of
large companies.
4. The skills of managers: Large multinational-managers, particular-
ly at the lower and medium levels, are more specialized, small-
firm managers have a more all-round function.
The main issue in Agency Theory is the aligning of the interests of
the ‘principal’ and the ‘agent’. The principal can be the firm owner or
the shareholders, while the agent is the employee (a manager is also
an employee). A first advantage of small firms is that in a small firm
with few layers of hierarchy there is a dominant entrepreneur/owner
who is always present and keeps an eye open for his own sake
because he is the residual claimant. Every penny lost in the process
will come entirely out of the pocket of the owner, so he will monitor
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monitoring versus costs of shirking). Besides, as is explained under
assumption 3, the time and effort it takes to monitor a small firm is
relatively low. This altogether will make costs of monitoring and
shirking in small or starting enterprises considerably lower than in
older and bigger ones with multiple owners.
The solution for the incentive problems with monitoring in larger
companies is often found in profit sharing for managers. This is not
as easy as it looks either, taking into account the different possibili-
ties of determining the companies’ profit, and all kinds of options for
a manager to shirk anyway, independent of the profitability.
Furthermore, other important performance indicators could be taken
into account as well (this is particularly relevant in the long term
because an important part of the shareholders may not care about
other performance indicators than profit because of their short-term
focus). A positive scale effect is that bigger firms can more easily
attract the highly qualified (and specialized) managers (see assump-
tion 4) (see Ekelund and Hébert, 1997).
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Box 3.5 The goal of the entrepreneur
Roughly spoken, there are two types of entrepreneurs: the so-
called shopkeeper and the Schumpeterian type.
The Schumpeterian-type entrepreneur distinguishes himself by his
never-ending quest for creative innovations and higher market
share. Schumpeterian-type entrepreneurs are motivated by more
than just money, they want to be winners, and they want to
achieve ever-higher goals.
The shopkeeper is the type of entrepreneur who went into busi-
ness for reasons such as:
• to achieve a certain degree of freedom
• being the son/daughter of the former owner
• being the son/daughter of someone of the same profession
• having lost a job, or due to a bad labour market situation, etc.
It is easy to understand that these types of motivation do not nec-
essarily push the shopkeeper to strive for higher performance once
settled. Moreover, striving for higher performance may necessitate
more investments and thus reliance on stockholders or outside
investors, resulting in decreasing control by the shopkeeper over
his (family) business, and his freedom of decision making.
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Demand factors
For some products demand is not large enough or changes too fast to
generate scale economies. This is true when the geographical market
size (country, region) is small,
1 or when the product just is too spe-
cialized to attract a large group of customers (niche markets) (see also
section 3.1.1 about economies of specialization and vertical integra-
tion). The factor of market size explains why the European market,
and internationalization in general, leads to structural changes in firm
size. In case of economies of scale, firms might realize a more optimal
position on their cost curve when the market grows. Without market
restrictions, and with the increasing technological development, a sec-
tor such as banking may turn out to be a natural oligopoly, on world
scale. For goods with fast-changing demand time doesn’t allow for the
reaping of scale economies. Furthermore, the economy is booming in
America and Western Europe and this increases the demand for ‘tai-
lor-made’ products, individualism is gaining ground in the consumer’s
psychology. Still, technological development is important here as well,
it can diminish the relevancy of demand and increase the relevancy of
economies of scale. With more flexible production methods, im-
proving communication over long distances and reduced transport
prices and time, production can now be centralized easier than some
time ago, and scale can be increased.
Life cycle theory of the firm
New, young firms are almost always very small, and it rarely happens
that firms start at their theoretically ‘optimal’ size. In Chapter 2 we
already saw that in the Netherlands, existing firms do not change
much in size, measured over a period of 5 years. New firms, how-
ever, are the ones that create most new jobs. The life cycle theory of
the firm gives an explanation for the fact that small firms can exist,
while they produce (far) below their theoretically optimal scale (or
minimum efficient scale). According to the life cycle theory (see de
Jong, 1993 and 1998), firms walk through several phases (possibly
opposite phases for different products), from the moment they enter
the market with a new product or an innovation, through expansion,
maturity and stagnation. Learning (and the economies of scale that
learning can generate, see section 3.1.1) is very important, particu-
larly in the first stages of the life cycle of the firm. To reach a stage of
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1 An example can be found in the difference between firms in the (thinly populated) Canadian
economy and in the much larger market of the US. Canadian firms often face too small mar-
ket demand to operate at minimum costs and, therefore, firms often produce different prod-
ucts and are less often specialised than firms in the United States.
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process of learning and gaining experience to reach that size. During
each phase of the life cycle different factors influence the optimal
scale of the firm. In the stage of expansion strong market growth is
facilitating entry of competitors and autonomous firm growth, while
in a ‘mature’ market, take-overs become important to increase mar-
ket share. The stage in the life cycle for the dominant product of a
firm thus partly determines the decision to increase or decrease in
scale. Of course, other factors may be equally important, such as the
general economic situation, the availability of qualified labour, the
institutional environment, etc.
Box 3.6 gives a short impression of how firm size is explained empi-
rically. ‘Gibrat’s law’ gives a statistical explanation for the large dif-
ferences in firm size. It says that firm size differs randomly. There is,
however, evidence that the statistical explanation does not hold in
most empirical studies.
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Box 3.6 ‘Gibrat’s law’
Many articles are written on ‘Gibrat’s law’ which states that
growth follows a random walk independently of firm size, no size
group of firms should show significantly higher growth rates than
another and growth today does not influence growth tomorrow
(no persistence of growth).
The possibility of a relation between firm size and growth has been
a big subject in recent decades. A large number of studies have
been done world-wide to find out which size group of firms is
responsible for the highest growth rates and the largest job cre-
ation.
The majority of the studies rejects the validity of Gibrat’s law,
Almus and Nerlinger (1998) point at some of these studies:
Wagner (1992), Reid (1995), Harhoff, Stahl and Woywode (1998),
and Weiss (1998).
Some conclusions that can be made from the studies mentioned
above are:
• Growth is not independent of size: Smaller firms possess high-
er growth potential than larger ones, growth rates decrease with
size and age.
• Growth is not random: Growth today influences growth tomor-
row, there is a ‘persistence of growth’.
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The current Chapter investigated how firm size can be influenced by
firm-specific factors. The following basic mechanisms are elaborated:
• economies of scale and scope
• transactions-costs theory
• agency-costs theory
• demand factors and life cycle theory of the firm.
Some of these factors are specific to the market the firm is in, for
instance the cost structure of the technology or the transaction costs
and demand factors, others are more general such as managers’
motives and life cycle effects. It seems reasonable to assume that the
specific factors present natural borders to firm size in a certain mar-
ket, while within these borders, size can fluctuate because of the gen-
eral factors. For instance, a company that produces and supplies elec-
tricity will need a certain minimum scale in order to be a serious
competitor, this minimum efficient scale can be the result of high
fixed technical costs, fixed costs of transactions (setting up a system
of measurement and payment), or demand factors that make large
companies seem more reliable to consumers of electricity.
These natural borders are relevant for all the competitors in the
(same) market, where the companies start to differ strategically is in
their decisions concerning the processes of the value chain. Which
activities are kept in-house and which are outsourced? Exactly how
big the specific company is can then be explained by looking at exter-
nal factors, such as demand factors and the stage of the life cycle it is
in, and by looking at internal factors. The latter ones are parts of the
culture of the organization and the management that give each com-
pany its own ‘face’, these factors are important in influencing, for
instance, the entrepreneurial spirit in a company (innovativeness,
competitive aggressiveness, proactivity, etc.) and the overall commit-
ment.
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• When the law is tested for size groups individually, deviations
from the law are strongest for the smallest size groups.
One can say that these results support the life cycle theory of the
firm:
• Firms grow relatively strong at first, then growth declines.
• Growth isn’t random in the life cycle theory either.
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vant. The theory of economies of scale and scope and the theory of
transaction costs originate from different periods in economic histo-
ry, but they are trying to explain the same problems. While they use
different assumptions and preconditions (particularly as regards
human behaviour and rationality), they are strongly supplementing
each other. Transaction-costs theory only makes sense when the the-
ory of economies of scale and scope is taken into account.
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sectoral level
In this Chapter we search for theoretical explanations for the average
size and size distribution of a sector or industry cluster. It should be
noted that there is no straight boundary between the factors deter-
mining size at the firm level (Chapter 3) and at the sectoral level.
Obviously, firms in one sector often have similar characteristics (costs
structures), and particularly the transaction-costs theory (section 3.2)
is important in explaining the size of sectors as well as the size of the
firm. In the current Chapter, however, we focus on relations between
firms, such as motives for co-operation and clustering and on factors
that influence the size of firms in the whole sector, such as the eco-
nomic situation or the market structure. Section 4.1 looks at external
economies of scale, section 4.2 at network economies and section 4.3
at the theory about standard setting. These theories give important
explanations for co-operation or anti-co-operative behaviour. Section
4.4 concludes.
4.1 External economies of scale
Internal economies of scale (see section 3.1) seem to have decreased
in significance over the last decades, with the movement away from
large-scale mass production to more flexible production methods (see
Piore and Sabel, 1984). This may explain part of the average size
decrease of firms. According to Oughton & Whittam (1997), external
economies of scale are increasingly important.
External economies of scale are forces which cause the supply price
to fall as the industry expands. These are external effects, because
they affect the industry as a whole, not the individual firm propor-
tionally. With external scale economies, the expansion of a competi-
tive industry brings about cost reductions. These cost reductions arise
not at the firm level but at the industry level or a local or regional
level and are reflected in a downward movement of the entire costs
curve of (all) firms whereas internal economies of scale reflect move-
ments along the costs curve of a firm (see figure 4.1) (see Oughton &
Whittam, 1997, p. 4).
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External economies of scale
External economies of scale occur when an expansion of total
industry output causes average industry costs to fall.
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increase of existing firms, since all firms, by definition, already have
their optimum size in competitive markets. The mechanism is that:
‘if the industry grows larger, it becomes possible to reorganize the
industry, making greater use of specialization and division of labour.
In turn, specialization and division of labour improve the productiv-
ity of labour and other resources, and so cut costs’. The long-run sup-
ply curve shifts downwards in industries with external economies of
scale (see McCain, 1981, p. 224).
Oughton and Whittam (1997) distinguish 3 types of external
economies of scale:
1. pecuniary or competitive external economies
2. technological or exogenous external economies
3. collective external economies.
Ad 1) Competitive external economies
Competitive external economies of scale follow from internal
economies of scale in a competitive market environment; costs reduc-
tions caused by internal economies of scale are passed on as lower
prices to consumers and buyers, so that external economies of scale
can rise. For instance, when investment in new capacity in an indus-
try lowers prices and increases benefits for other firms or consumers.
Since internal economies of scale are caused by high fixed costs (indi-
visibilities), which imply entry barriers and thus limited competitive-
ness of the relevant markets, it can be questioned whether internal
scale economies will always lead to the passing on of cost decreases.





1: internal economies of scale
2: external economies of scale
unit costs
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Figure 4.1 Long-run average costs curve of firms in a sector with internal
and external economies of scale
1
2
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economies is possible.
Ad 2) Technological/exogenous external economies
Technological or exogenous external economies are independent of
the degree of competition and independent of internal economies of
scale. Exogenous economies appear when an individual firm profits
from the level of output and utilization of factors of another firm or
group of firms (the costs curve of the individual firm shifts down and
entry barriers are lowered). It can involve infrastructure investments
or education programmes that are financed by groups of firms, or by
the government, but from which all firms can profit. It also involves
spillover effects of technological knowledge and innovation.
Ad 3) Collective external economies
Collective external economies arise when firms co-operate by pooling
fixed costs. This leads to a downward shift of the average costs curve
(of the co-operating firms) and to lower entry barriers (but only if
entry to the network of co-operating firms is not restricted). Collective
external economies of scale enable small firms to generate scale
economies, by co-operating, particularly as regards secondary busi-
ness functions such as R&D and marketing. Co-operation can reduce
the minimum efficient scale in markets and it will enlarge competi-
tion because entry barriers are lowered. However, with many of these
functions, firms also profit when they do not participate themselves,
so that they can act as free riders. There are different ways in which
co-operation can be stimulated and free riding prevented. Using game
theory and examples of successful co-operation, Oughton and
Whittam (1997) show that co-operating in formal structures such as
joint ventures has proved to be the most effective way. The theory of
agency costs applies to these kinds of problems, see section 3.3.
4.2 Network externalities
The concept of network externalities is the following (see Liebowitz
and Margolis, 1994):
The characteristics of external economies of scale as described above
are largely overlapping with those of network externalities, which are
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Network externalities
Network externalities occur if the utility that a user derives from
consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents
consuming the good (as with telephony, e-mail, fax machines, etc.). 
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ence between the two mechanisms: Network externalities mean that
the value of a good increases for consumers with the number of units
sold (as is the case with telephone or e-mail connections; the value
of your e-mail connection increases when a larger group of your
friends or business partners is getting connected as well). This
implies an upward shift in the demand curve, and thus an increase in
production. With external scale economies, the costs curve shifts
downward, which lowers prices, increases demand, value and pro-
duction, etc. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show these shifts in costs and
demand curves. The costs curve is in these examples supposed to
correspond with the supply curve and costs (or prices) are for sim-
plicity assumed to be constant.
Figure 4.2 Demand shift with network effects
Figure 4.3 Supply shift with external economies of scale
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tion externalities of networks. The first is, as described above, that the
value of a unit of the good increases with the number of units sold.
There is a positive production effect because this consumption effect
does not imply an upward sloping demand curve, but an upward shift
in the (as usual) downward sloping demand curve which is the result
of an increase in the number of units expected to be sold
(Economides, 1996, p. 678).
As already mentioned above, the typical application of this theory is
to telecommunication networks, where the value of a fax, telephone
or e-mail connection increases in value with every new connection
added to the network. Not only the communication and information
sectors are network industries, but also the transport and railroad sec-
tor (when more people use the train, it is worthwhile to invest in
more stations and connections). There are, however, many other sec-
tors in the economy (sectors without physical networks) where net-
work externalities can be found, think about the value of fashion
clothes or popular movies and, of course, software. When most com-
panies use the software operating system Windows, it is easier to
adjust to that standard than to choose another (incompatible) system.
This subject is further elaborated in the next section and in box 4.1
below.
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Box 4.1 Network effects in information goods
Information goods (software, movies, radio and television pro-
grammes, etc.) are goods for which the fixed costs of production
are (sometimes extremely) high, particularly when large R&D
inputs are needed, while the reproduction costs are tending to
zero. This means there are huge economies of scale to be reaped
in production of information goods (see Varian, 1999). The issue
is complicated by the fact that for some information goods, and
particularly for software operating systems and applications, there
are also important network effects; Windows is an attractive sys-
tem because almost everyone uses it and all these users can
exchange their work easily. How should such products, with high
fixed costs and very low marginal costs of reproduction, and with
network effects, be priced in a market? 
Normally, such information goods are sold by ‘creaming off’ the
market and by applying price discrimination before competition
forces prices down to variable costs. An example of creaming off
can be seen in the film industry. Movies are first shown in the the-
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A factor related to network externalities that is important in explain-
ing size and size distribution at the firm level is standard setting. This
strategic factor is particularly important in modern economic sectors
like the IT and computer industry, or sectors which are strongly influ-
enced by IT and other new technologies In these industries, strategic
decisions made in the past often determine firm size in the future,
since the development of the new industry depends on which tech-
nology is chosen as a standard. Once a technology has become a
standard, entry is prevented by network externalities, providing pos-
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atres, and only after some time videotapes can be bought and only
later the movies are shown on television. Price and quality dis-
crimination is commonplace is these markets, not only in time but
also between consumer groups, for instance when businesses pay
more than students.
These markets for information goods typically are monopolistic
competition markets, based on product differentiation. This means
that competitors with exactly the same products are scarce, but
that there is competition of products with different specifications
that satisfy identical needs. In such markets, pricing restrictions
are at first less rigid than those in ‘normal’ competitive markets
(with homogeneous goods), but since the market of information
goods has relatively low entry barriers, competing companies will
soon copy a successful product and start competing on price. 
In the software market, the same strategy of creaming off the mar-
ket and price discrimination is usually followed, but lately, we also
see new software offered free-of-charge. The reason for this is
found in the network effects. The good will only gain value when
as many people as possible use it. So in order to win, producers
try to gain a large consumer base quickly by providing the product
(almost) free-of-charge (see Varian, 1999).
In such a market, earning back of the high investments that were
made to develop the product should follow later, when a (partial)
monopoly position is reached and applications and updates can be
sold against relatively high margins. For Internet software, adver-
tising should compensate the strategy of free distribution of soft-
ware. 
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tions are created (see, for instance, the case of Microsoft, box 4.2).
Technologies may display increasing returns of adoption, and often
one out of several competing technologies ends up as the standard
while not necessarily being the ‘best’ technology (see Arthur, 1989).
The fact that not always the ‘best’ product wins in the market, can
be seen as a kind of market failure. This means that the market out-
come is not optimal. Economic literature on standards has given a lot
of attention to this possibility of market failure with respect to opting
for a standard. The argument is essentially this: an established stan-
dard can persist over a challenging standard, even where all users
prefer the challenging standard. This is the result of the fact that users
are unable to co-ordinate their choices and do not have perfect infor-
mation.
Standard setting and particularly lock-in effects can be illustrated
with an example about which much discussion is going on recently,
that is the case of Microsoft. Box 4.2 elaborates this case.
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Box 4.2 Microsoft and the rules of the software market
The company of Bill Gates is accused by the United States
Government of the abuse of market power. That Microsoft has this
power is quite obvious (nearly all PCs on this planet use the oper-
ating system Windows), and the judge already made clear that
there is sufficient prove of abuse. Where does the ‘success story’
start? How is it possible for one company to virtually wipe out all
competitors and become such a ‘monster’ corporation? This box
illustrates that this has all been the result of software market-spe-
cific strategies.
In the early days of personal computers, there were only two main
competitors: IBM and Apple. IBM was by far the biggest, the then
still young Microsoft company made a deal with IBM to install all
PCs with the MS DOS operating system. This immediately made
Microsoft the biggest player in the software market. Experts have
always pointed to the advantages of the Apple system: the use of
the mouse, the graphical buttons, the overall user friendliness.
When Microsoft introduced Windows it was obvious from the start
that most of the advantages of the Apple system had been incor-
porated by Microsoft (but still, the majority of the experts preferred
the Apple system). Microsoft became an even bigger player, even
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when IBM lost its dominant position. (A customer or company can
easily change computer brand, but it cannot change software sys-
tem as simply.) The continuing dominance of Microsoft with MS
DOS and Windows made that all application manufacturers were
almost forced to write their products for these operating systems
(all potential customers used these systems). Application manufac-
turers were fighting among each other to get the favour of
Microsoft, who gained a strong foothold in bargaining both with
customers as well as suppliers of software. Microsoft was able to
show enormous profit rates, which is by itself proof of a monopoly
position. 
The Internet revolution, however, presented a strong threat to Bill
Gates c.s. Personal computers became network computers with the
possibility of the market of operating system software being
replaced by the market of Internet browsers and server software.
Bill Gates quickly understood the threat and launched an aggressive
attack on the main competitor, Netscape (from Netscape
Navigator). Evidence for this attack strategy written down in one of
his memos was found by the lawyers. Of course, the goal was to
gain control of the new market, too. Microsoft made its own brows-
er (Microsoft Explorer) and made it a standard part of the Windows
package. The Explorer icon was put on the desktop. But in addition,
Microsoft used its power to force the hardware producers to use its
Internet browser instead of Netscape Navigator and to delete the
Navigator icon by threatening not to supply Windows anymore.
When users wanted to install the more popular Netscape Navigator
by themselves, Windows wouldn’t co-operate. 
The market share of Netscape Navigator declined quickly, and even
the countermeasure of supplying the browser free-of-charge didn’t
work. Because Netscape was not part of the Windows package, dis-
tribution costs were higher, and there was not as much money
available for innovation. The only solution left was seeking a part-
ner, and Netscape was driven into the arms of Microsoft partner
AOL. This ended the threat of competition for Internet Explorer. 
In the lawsuit against Microsoft, Judge Penfield Jackson’s opinion
is clear: Microsoft has abused its power, Microsoft earned its prof-
its over the back of the consumer, by killing the threat of more
advanced or cheaper products and, finally, Microsoft’s behaviour
has imposed severe damage to the economy. At the time of writ-
ing, Microsoft is judged guilty of abusing its power, but sentencing
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Where Chapter 3 focused on firm size of the individual firm, Chapter
4 deals with how firm size differs and is distributed over a group of
firms, and how determinants of scale influence the average size and
size distribution of all firms within a sector. The following theories
are worked out:
• external economies of scale and scope
• network externalities
• standard setting and lock-in effects.
External economies of scale and scope can explain why the number
of firms within a sector or a cluster increases, and it can explain
changes in the average firm size within sectors. For instance, external
economies of scale occur when a new technology becomes available,
and it lowers the costs of all firms in the sector. This will decrease
costs and prices, and increase demand and thus the number of firms.
Through internal economies of scale, each firm may have a smaller
minimum efficient scale, because of the cheaper technology.
Network effects and lock-in effects are less relevant for explaining
average firm size; they can give an explanation for very skew size dis-
tributions within sectors. The attributes of a sector can create cir-
cumstances in which standards are becoming important and (tempo-
rary) monopoly situations can occur. The best examples of network
sectors are found in ICT-related sectors, such as software and
telecommunications.
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has not been imposed as yet. There are four possible punishments
for Microsoft, in case Microsoft does not win the case. These
options are; breaking up the firm, forcing Microsoft to allow com-
petitors to sell and improve Windows, requiring Microsoft to dis-
tribute rival software products such as Netscape’s Internet brows-
er, or forcing the firm to stop price discrimination.
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in firm size
The previous chapters showed how so-called ‘basic mechanisms’ are
working for firms and sectors. Attributes of firms determine which
mechanisms are relevant. For instance, for firms with high fixed
costs, economies of scale can explain a large firm size. However,
attributes are influenced by external factors. The market size may
grow because of trade liberalization, or fixed costs may decrease
because of technological developments. External changes have the
strongest impact when they are structural; then they are called trends.
The objective of the present Chapter is to link the basic mechanisms
to the actual, dynamic situation of the (Dutch) economy. We try to
explain why the macro picture does not show too many changes,
while at the sectoral and particularly the micro level, the dynamics
are strong. The objective is not to be complete or to give empirically
justified relationships. The current Chapter is based on the informa-
tion of the literature study in the preceding chapters, and on the
boxes with illustrations and examples throughout chapters 3 and 4.
In section 5.1 we elaborate six important structural trends, and the
way in which they can affect firm size. Where possible, we link the
trends to the Dutch developments in firm size, as elaborated in
Chapter 2. Section 5.2 summarizes the results.
5.1 Strategic trends and basic mechanisms
Looking at relevant literature on trends (see a.o. Acs, Carlsson and
Thurik (1996), Peters and Lever (1996) and Brock and Evans (1986)),
the following six trends seem to be the most relevant:
1. Globalization and internationalization
2. Technological development
3. Deregulation and liberalization
4. Increase of uncertainty
5. (Mass) individualization
6. Flexibility of labour relations and increasing education level.
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Trends 
According to CPB (1997) trends are: ‘changes of conditions that per-
sist for a certain period of time’. ‘Conditions’ in this definition are
‘the characteristics of the environment that affect co-ordination:
there are social, technological, economic and demographic trends’
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and how the trend affects the environment of firms and, subse-
quently, how it affects individual firms. Then we elaborate the basic
scale mechanisms that are influenced by such changes. The basic
mechanism may cause a relative scale increase or decrease; this out-
come is worked out where possible. It is not our objective to be com-
plete in this section, since there are many ways in which trends inter-
act at the firm and the sector level, but we attempt to define the most
relevant relationships.
5.1.1 Globalization
Globalization; changes in the environment of the firm
Globalization or internationalization means that the world is becom-
ing smaller. One of the most important pillars of globalization is the
increase of free trade among more countries. Many treaties were
drafted during the last decades, such as for instance GATT/WTO,
NAFTA and between the EU Member States. Not only goods are trad-
ed more easily. There is also a growing mobility of capital and labour
throughout the world. Globalization also means that the ‘distance of
control’ of firms or individuals increases, caused by the use of new
means of communication.
What does globalization mean for the environment of firms and the
attributes of the sector in which firms operate? Five points are rele-
vant:
• increasing market size
• opening up of new markets
• intensified competition
• changes in demand characteristics
• growing supply of capital and labour.
First, increasing world trade enhances the size of the relevant geo-
graphical market (for instance, from the Netherlands to the European
Union). Second, new markets can be accessed that were not open to
trade before. A new market can be another country or a market for a
new product. Third, opening up your home market means also a
growing number of competitors and, thus, intensified international
competition. International competition is also increasing because
firms have larger distance of control by using information and com-
munication technology. A firm based in Amsterdam can easily man-
age its subsidiaries, in say, Kuala Lumpur, without physical presence
there. Fourth, within a globalizing world, the characteristics of
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developing more and more the same taste, while on the other hand
there are significant groups of consumers who have different tastes.
These groups were too small to accommodate in segmented markets,
but can be accommodated now. A fifth and last change in environ-
ment is that not only global trade in goods is facilitated, but also
mobility of human capital and financial capital can find its way more
easily across international borders. This means that the supply of
(high-quality) labour increases, as well as the supply of capital.
Relevant basic mechanisms and scale
How do the changes in firm and sector environment affect the basic
mechanisms that are relevant for firm size? There are many factors
interrelated here. According to the classification in Chapters 3 and 4,
we first deal with the relevant factors at the level of the firm, then
with the relevant factors at the sectoral level.
At the firm level: size increase
The firm-specific determinants of scale are all changed by globaliza-
tion. When new markets are reached, and existing markets are grow-
ing larger, firms can realize economies of scale and scope more easi-
ly. The availability of production factors such as labour and capital is
to a lesser extent a bottleneck factor for reaching economies of scale.
Another factor that may cause (average) firm size to increase is that
international competition intensifies as a consequence of globaliza-
tion. Stronger competition will have impact on the basic mechanism
of transaction and agency costs. Firms and managers have to act
more efficient (X-inefficiencies will be reduced), to deal with the
competitive environment. This is often a reason for firms to strength-
en their position by merging or taking over other firms. Examples can
be found in the banking sector, where the number of mergers grew,
and where the large firms have grown larger over the past years (see
Chapter 2).
1 Also the business services sector (accountants, consul-
tancy) is strongly influenced by the globalization trend. From nation-
ally oriented enterprises, these enterprises are increasing their mar-
kets world-wide. In this sector the number of mergers and acquisi-
tions grew strongly.
There are also factors causing firm size to decrease. The growing
international competition can be detrimental for large firms that used
to be ‘protected’ by national borders and trade regulation. New (small
and dynamic) firms can profit by competing with the bureaucracy
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1 In Chapter 2, the financial services sector does not show an increase in relative terms (table
2.2) in the number of mergers. However, in absolute terms, the number of mergers does
increase, and relatively stronger in banking than in the other financial services.
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entering new markets are lower, of which small firms can profit more
than large firms. Small (new) firms may also be better in finding new
(missing) markets and niche markets that were too small to serve in
national markets. An example of these effects in the Dutch economy
can be found in the wholesale sector, where average firm size
decreased over the past years.
At the sectoral level: small effects
Sector-specific determinants of scale can also change as a conse-
quence of globalization, but less direct so than the firm-specific deter-
minants. Of course, the external circumstances of the sector change
with those of its firms. However, globalization does not directly cause
external economies of scale or network effects to grow larger, or lock-
in effects to occur. While these determinants probably would never
be around in a world that was not globalized, they are not directly
caused by globalization.
5.1.2 Technological development
Technological development; changes in the environment of the
firm
Technological development is one of the most radical factors of
change in the environment of firms. The most import technological
changes are currently the growing importance and growing use of
information and communication technology (ICT), the developments
in biotechnology and those in micro technology. The ICT trend is cur-
rently the most dominating trend, and seems to have the largest
impact on scale. Therefore, we focus on the ICT trend in this section.
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Globalization and firm size
It can be concluded that the globalization trend seems to predom-
inantly favour scale increase. The growing market size, creation of
new markets, the globalization of demand and of labour and cap-
ital supply and, finally, the intensified world-wide competition, all
seem to stimulate scale increase. There are, of course, some reverse
developments, such as the opportunities for smaller and less
bureaucratic firms in the more dynamic world, where transaction
costs are lower. However, scale increase seems to be the dominant
outcome when we isolate the globalization trend from other devel-
opments.
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distribution process, the growing number and use of new methods to
communicate and send large sets of data very fast, over large dis-
tances, are examples of what ICT accomplishes.
For firms and sectors technological development means that they are
confronted with a more dynamic and more competitive environment.
Firms that implement the new technology can often produce at lower
costs and decrease their prices. New technology may decrease the
minimum efficient scale of a production process. Also, firms are con-
fronted with faster-changing supplies by their competitors, who use
the technological development to enter new markets, create new
products, or communicate in a different way with their clients.
Relevant basic mechanisms and scale
At the firm level: decreasing firm size
Technological development strongly affects the basic mechanisms at
the firm level, since costs structures are often changed (because of
external economies of scale, relevant at the sectoral level, see below).
Technological development, and particularly ICT, lowers the transac-
tion costs for firms, in communicating within the firm, or with sup-
pliers and customers. Transactions can be settled faster and control is
more transparent. This also implies that the position of smaller firms
improves relative to that of large firms. Vertical integration is no
longer needed to lower transaction costs. On the demand side, firms
are confronted with faster-changing consumer tastes according to
which they have to adjust their supply. Production processes are
becoming more flexible and better adapted to demand. This process
may increase the number of transactions, but it would not be possi-
ble if transaction costs had not decreased so strongly by the use of
(information and communication) technology.
In the sectors of the Dutch economy, technological development was
an important factor in explaining the average firm size decrease over
the past ten years in among others manufacturing, financial services
and business services (see Chapter 2). In manufacturing, scale
economies became less important because of technological develop-
ment, and in financial and business services the decreasing transac-
tions costs were relevant.
At the sectoral level: size decrease and increase
At the level of the sector, technology also has a strong impact.
External economies of scale, network effects and standard setting are
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opment (in relation to the globalization and liberalization trends),
and particularly ICT. While the process of innovating often urges a
large firm size to facilitate economies of scale, after the innovation
has been introduced and is available to the sector, it often causes min-
imum efficient firm size to decrease. Lowering the minimum efficient
scale of new technologies provides opportunities for smaller com-
petitors to reap the benefits of these technologies. These are external
economies of scale; the increase of the sectoral output decreases aver-
age industry costs. Average firm size can be reduced and entry bar-
riers to the industry lowered because of these external economies of
scale.
Network effects are of particular importance. Almost all ICT-related
products are linked to networks, and increase in value when the
number of users grows. In a globalized and liberalized world, net-
work effects can create new (often temporary) ‘natural’ monopolies.
A natural strategy for firms in industries with network effects is to try
to set new standards and thus lock-in customers.
Since the sectors of the Dutch economy presented in Chapter 2 are
very aggregated, we cannot establish the impact of technological
development on firm size. However, network effects can be expected
to be relevant in the Dutch ICT sector, although these effects are often
relevant in an international or global context. Examples of the impact
of network effects are shown by the Dutch companies Philips and
Baan. Standard setting is important for almost all products that
Philips produces. It was successful with setting standards in its early
history with the light bulb, and more recently with the introduction
of the compact disc, but unsuccessful with products such as the
‘Video 2000’ and the ‘Digital Compact Cassette’. The example of
Baan, a company that develops integrated software products, shows
how fragile and temporary success can be in network sectors. The
company boomed a few years ago, but seems to be on its return now,
while competitors are taking over rapidly.
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Technological development and firm size
It can be concluded that the basic mechanisms that are relevant at
the level of the firm decrease average firm size. However, the
mechanisms at the sectoral level may also cause the average firm
size to increase. It can be expected that size decrease will be dom-
inant since the first factors are relevant in almost all sectors, while
the size increasing mechanisms are only relevant for some specif-
ic sectors.
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Deregulation and liberalization; changes in the environment of
the firm
Deregulation and liberalization of markets is a trend that is particu-
larly relevant in European countries. There are several steps that gov-
ernments have taken to create more dynamic and flexible markets,
and to correct possible governance failures that had occurred after a
period of increasing regulation. Deregulation started with privatiza-
tion of state monopolies in public utilities. Postal services and
telecommunications are appealing examples. Together with the pri-
vatization of the often state-owned enterprises in these sectors, these
utility markets were liberalized (or ‘re-regulated’). The European
countries also implemented stricter competition law. The objective is
that in more liberal markets, the law should be strict in prohibiting
price or market agreements between companies (cartels) and to pre-
vent the abuse of market power. A third track of the deregulation pol-
icy is that governments should cut in superfluous regulation so that
firms are less restricted in doing business. The latter track means that
the Dutch government tries to bring down the administrative burden
of regulation, that entry of new firms is made easier by abolishing the
business-licensing requirements, or that specific regulations like the
strict law on shop opening hours were abolished.
It follows from this brief overview that the environment of firms
changes rather drastically because of deregulation. The following
effects follow directly from deregulation:
• Intensified competition, national and international
• Lower entry barriers for starting firms
• Lower restrictions, limitations and regulatory burden for entrepre-
neurship in general.
By increasing competition and dynamics, deregulation strengthens
the trend of technological development. When the environment is
less stable, firms are forced to innovate, because otherwise they will
lose customers. Clearly, globalization is also related to liberalization,
because if trade between countries would not be liberalized, global-
ization would not be possible.
Relevant basic mechanisms and scale
At the firm level: predominantly size decrease
Relevant basic mechanisms at the level of the firm are changing when
the regulatory environment changes. With more intense competition,
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relevant when compared to cost factors, while flexibility and adapt-
ability (qualities of small firms) are increasingly important. A specific
kind of deregulation, the regulatory compliance, is actually pushing
down the fixed costs of regulation, and thus lowers economies of scale
for satisfying regulatory administration. On the other hand, when
economies of scale are relevant, the stronger competition can also
increase their relevancy. This is the case in the telecommunications
market. Stronger competition implies that costs have to be cut and
scale and scope economies have to be utilized optimally.
In the Dutch situation, the improved (regulatory) climate for starting
a firm (lower entry barriers, lower costs for regulatory compliance,
etc.) is for a part reflected in the large number of new start-ups over
the past years. The lowering of entry restrictions and the lowering of
restrictions for entrepreneurs in general may increase transaction
costs. The reason is that more entry and fewer rules may also lower
transparency of the market. There may be more unqualified entrepre-
neurs, which increases search costs, costs of contracts and of control
for every transaction. An increase in these costs means that firms are
more inclined to integrate forwards or backwards instead of sourcing
activities out. However, in most markets the transparency will be
increased after some time when sectors introduce self-regulation sys-
tems and quality-control systems. A very important factor related to
stronger competition is that uncertainty about the market develop-
ment is growing. This leads to a rise in transaction costs, and may thus
cause a rise in firm size.
Agency costs, the costs of finding the right incentive structure within
a company, are supposed to decrease when competition increases.
Usually, competition does not only increase in the product markets,
but also in labour markets. Employees have more incentives to act in
the interest of the firm, to reduce the likelihood of being fired, or to
improve their prospects for a wage raise. Besides, the risk of bank-
ruptcy is larger in strongly competitive markets. This also increases
the incentives of employees to act in the interest of the firm (and main-
tenance of their jobs). Deregulation in general causes an increase of
entrepreneurship (also within firms) and this may induce smaller
average firm sizes. This development clearly shows in almost all sec-
tors of the Dutch economy.
The fact that many new small firms enter the market in periods of lib-
eralization (caused by lower entry restrictions) generates a life cycle
effect. At that specific period in time, there are relatively more young
and small firms.
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Determinants of scale relevant at the sectoral level are also affected
by deregulation. Internal economies of scale are passed on as cost
decreases to the rest of the market if the environment is competitive.
When cost reductions are passed on, external economies of scale
occur, and this means that new (smaller) firms may enter and capi-
talize on lower costs. In network industries like telecommunication
or electricity provision, competition policy plays an important role.
Competition policy actually provides more strict rules in liberalized
markets. While network industries may have the tendency to become
(temporary) natural monopolies, competition policy should act to
prevent the possible abuse of market power by such monopolistic
companies.
5.1.4 Other trends
The three trends described above are the most relevant trends for the
impact on firm scale. There are some other trends relevant for scale,
but they are all more or less derivations of the globalization, techno-
logical development and deregulation trends.
Increased uncertainty
The trend of increasing uncertainty is a result of both the increasing
rates of competition and the fast technological change. The environ-
ment of firms is more uncertain, because in general the speed of
change is increasing, product life cycles are shorter, there are more
and more new competitors, there is more entry of new firms, all sub-
markets are more dynamic than they used to be and changes in
demand are also uncertain.
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Deregulation/liberalization and firm size
Summarizing, deregulation and liberalization affect the basic
mechanisms both in the way that firm size may increase or
decrease, but it can be expected that the size-decreasing effect
dominates. We cannot draw an overall conclusion. Where firms
with high fixed costs may grow more dependent on economies of
scale, because of stronger competition, there are also more oppor-
tunities for entrepreneurship and small flexible firms. Transaction
costs (and firm size) may increase because of less market trans-
parency, but agency costs (and firm size) may decrease because of
better incentives in competitive markets. 
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basic mechanisms of transaction costs and agency costs. In section
3.2 it was stated that uncertainty is one of three factors that are rele-
vant for the costs of a transaction. The other two factors are fre-
quency of the transaction and the extent of asset specificity. When
these factors are high, contracts between firms are more complex,
and in-house organization of the activities is more likely. Higher
uncertainty may thus stimulate scale increase. An uncertain environ-
ment also summons defensive reactions of firms. Many (big) firms
show the defensive strategy of buying (small) successful firms in
each possible field of development, just in case this field turns out to
be a crucial one. This has to do with agency costs, i.e. the rationality
or irrationality of decisions of agents, but also with the strategy of
locking-in customers and standard setting. Firms do not take the risk
of missing a new and crucial technological development.
In the Dutch economy, the relatively strong merger activity in busi-
ness services may have been triggered by the high uncertainty in this
market. Technological development and all kinds of new activities (e-
commerce, multimedia applications, etc.) are creating uncertainty
about the future, which large firms attempt to secure by incorporat-
ing knowledge and by spreading activities over different countries
and activities.
(Mass) individualization
Mass individualization is a result of cultural and social developments.
Increasing individualization and the search for an own identity can
be seen as a cultural and social counterdevelopment to globalization.
Consumers no longer want to be treated and identified with the aver-
age consumer, ‘Joe Six-pack’, but they want to be treated as an indi-
vidual. Still, people identify themselves with social groups. Mass indi-
vidualization entails that demand changes from mass products to
individually adapted products. Firms react to this trend by supplying
basic products that can be adjusted to the taste of the (individualized)
consumer in the final stage. Technological development accommo-
dates this development of customization.
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Uncertainty and firm size
It can be concluded that the growing uncertainty in the environ-
ment of the firm predominantly seems to enhance scale increase.
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scale. The groups that people identify themselves with are growing
larger (these groups may be small within countries, but similar
groups can be found all over the world). This is partly caused by pop-
ular (American) TV shows and music that are marketed for and
received by people all over the world. Thus, there are many different
niche groups, but the groups are large enough for suppliers to serve
them.
Individualization interferes at the demand side of markets. There is a
growing (world-wide) market for many products, particularly fashion
products. The life cycles of these products become shorter, and the
technological requirements for production are increasing (short deliv-
ery time, individual adaptations to products, etc.). Within national or
regional sub-markets, there also may be a growing demand for spe-
cial products. Such products may be higher in price, but should dif-
fer from the mass (off-the-peg) products (niche markets).
Flexibility of (labour) relations and increasing education level
The relations of firms with suppliers and customers, but also with
their employees, are less stable than ten years ago, and this trend is
increasing. Again, growing internationalization of markets, deregula-
tion and competition are the factors behind this trend. Flexibility is
an important characteristic of firms, which means that the workforce
should also be flexible. On the demand side of the labour market,
there is a growing need for more flexibility, but also on the supply
side. Individualization is the most important trend behind this devel-
opment. Labour participation of women has grown strongly; the edu-
cation level has increased considerably over the last decades, not only
in Western Europe and America but also in Asia. This ‘new’ labour
force has relatively high expectations of their jobs. People want vari-
ety and their own responsibility, spare time is becoming more impor-
tant, and it is becoming rare that people work their whole life for only
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(Mass) individualization and firm size
Firm size may increase as a consequence of growing market size,
while on the other hand the growing importance of flexibility and
adjustability of suppliers, caused by mass individualization, may
stimulate smallness. Opportunities for small firms may also grow
because of the growing demand for high-quality speciality prod-
ucts in niche markets.
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Maslow’s pyramid of motivations (see Maslow, 1970). This pyramid
shows that when the first necessities of life are fulfilled, self-develop-
ment becomes more important.
It is important for firms to be flexible enough to adapt to fast-chang-
ing market conditions, and to be attractive employers. Hence, the
basic mechanisms of transaction costs, and particularly of agency
costs, are important. Section 3.3 shows that small firms are often bet-
ter at creating informal and flexible organizational structures, where
workers have better incentives and higher motivation. On the other
hand, scale economies are important for creating flexible labour rela-
tions. Bigger firms have advantages in the division of labour and pro-
viding attractive employment conditions. However, even in large
firms, the problems with motivation and rewarding are solved by
introducing more entrepreneurship (in smaller units with more
responsibility) within the firm, and thus introducing aspects of small
firms within large firms.
5.2 Concluding remarks
Structural trends in the economy have a strong impact on how basic
mechanisms of firm size work, and on the relative importance of the
different mechanisms. We saw that the trends may have impact on
several basic mechanisms at the same time, and that more often than
not, both scale increase and decrease can be the result of these
changing conditions. Without the claim of being complete, the pre-
ceding section described some relevant trends and the way in which
they could influence basic mechanisms of scale, and thus firm size.
Table 5.1 summarizes the general results that follow from this ‘exer-
cise’.
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Flexibility and firm size
It can be concluded that flexibility of labour relations can both
enhance scale increase and scale decrease, but smallness seems to
have more advantages than largeness. 
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relevant at the firm level or at the sectoral level
Firm level Sectoral level Overall
1. Globalization ++ 0 ++
2. Technological development —/— —/+ —
3. Deregulation/liberalization —/— — —/—
4. Uncertainty +/— 0 +/—
5. Individualization +/— 0 +/—
6. Flexibility of (labour) relations +/— — 0 —
+(+) = on average, factors (strongly) increase average firm size; — (—) = factors
(strongly) decrease firm size; 0 = factors do not affect firm size.
The table shows that for four trends the overall outcome seems to be
clear. Globalization increases average firm size, since the determi-
nants of scale at the level of the firm are predominantly affected in a
way that increases firm size. The determinants at the sectoral level
are not relevant here. Technological developments such as ICT can be
expected to decrease average firm size. The factors relevant at the sec-
toral level do increase firm size (for instance lock-in effects), but it is
expected that the firm-level determinants are dominant in decreasing
average firm size. Deregulation and liberalization can also be expect-
ed to decrease average firm size, both caused by firm-level and sec-
toral-level determinants of scale. Finally, the trend of more flexibility
also is expected to decrease firm size on average, since the dominat-
ing factor at the firm level is the advantage of small firms in being
flexible. For the other trends, no dominant direction of the develop-
ment of firm size can be seen.
The general conclusion is that the various trends can affect firm size
of individual firms or sectors in different ways, and that it depends
on the characteristics of the firm and its environment whether firms
will increase or decrease in size. With all the theoretical explanations
for firm and sector size in Chapters 3 and 4, we now are able to find
arguments for many different aspects of changes in firm size. It has
also become clear that there is never one theoretical explanation for
a certain development. The characteristics of the firm and its owners
and employees, the sector, the environment and structural changes in
the environment all have their impact, often in opposite directions. It
would be interesting for future research to study how the determi-
nants of scale and trends affect firm size in specific sectors or other
groups of firms in which strong changes were seen, so that the sub-
ject could be elaborated in a more empirical way.
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